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David P. Curriet
The lower federal courts remain divided over whether pendent
jurisdiction in federal question cases extends to nonfederal claims
against additional defendants. Although twice recently the Supreme Court has gone to great lengths to avoid the question, an
intervening decision on a related issue had effectively resolved the
problem. The result indicated by that decision, however, is difficult
to reconcile with the Court's long-standing construction of the same
statutory language in three other contexts.
I.

THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE AND PENDENT PARTIES

The foundation stone of modem pendent jurisdiction doctrine
is United Mine Workers v. Gibbs.I In a case arising under federal
law, a federal district court has "power" to entertain a claim between the same parties based on state law, provided that the state
and federal claims are closely enough related that, "without regard
to their federal or state character," the plaintiff "would ordinarily
be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding ....'2 The
policy underlying Gibbs is based on "judicial economy, convenience
and fairness-to litigants"; specifically, it looks to the undesirability
of requiring the plaintiff either to pursue two overlapping lawsuits
or to forgo his federal forum.'
t Harry N. Wyatt Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
1 383 U.S. 715 (1966).

2 Id. at 725.
3 Id. at 726.
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The constitutionality of pendent jurisdiction Gibbs explicitly
based upon the conclusion that "Cases. . . arising under. . . the
Laws of the United States" included state law claims closely enough
related to the federal:
Pendent jurisdiction, in the sense of judicial power, exists
whenever there is a claim "arising under [the] Constitution,
the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made. . . under
their Authority . . . ," U.S. Const., Art. III, § 2, and the relationship between that claim and the state claim permits the
conclusion that the entire action before the court comprises but
one constitutional "case."'
Although Gibbs did not similarly elaborate the statutory basis of
pendent jurisdiction, the sole conceivable rationale is the same: a
"civil action wherein the matter in controversy. . . arises under the
. . . laws . . . of the United States,"5 over which 28 U.S.C. § 1331
gives jurisdiction, 6 embraces state law claims sufficiently related to
7
the federal.
Most courts of appeals that have considered the issue have had
no difficulty extending Gibbs to cases in which an additional party
not subject to the federal claim is brought in to answer a state one.8
As Judge Friendly has written, "Mr. Justice Brennan's language [in
Gibbs] and the common sense considerations underlying it seem
broad enough to cover that problem also";9 when "the same facts
are. . . controlling with respect to both the federal and state claims
. . . the desirability of having both claims tried in the same forum
is self-evident.""0 The Ninth Circuit, however, has consistently disagreed,1 relying without elaboration on its earlier conclusory state'

Id. at 725 (footnote omitted).
28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970).
1 "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000. . . and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." Id.
I While the Court in Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 98 S. Ct. 2396, 2401 (1978)
described Gibbs as having "delineated the constitutional limits of federal judicial power" and
emphasized the need also to determine whether there were statutory limits on pendent or
ancillary jurisdiction, it did not suggest any alternative statutory basis for Gibbs itself.
s See, e.g., Bowers v. Moreno, 520 F.2d 843, 846-48 (1st Cir. 1975); Florida E. Coast Ry.
v. United States, 519 F.2d 1184, 1193-96 (5th Cir. 1975); Curtis v. Everette, 489 F.2d 516 (3d
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 995 (1974); Schulman v. Huck Finn, Inc., 472 F.2d 864,86667 (8th Cir. 1973); Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800, 809-11 (2d Cir.
1971).
Astor-Honor, Inc. v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 441 F.2d 627, 629 (2d Cir. 1971).
, Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800, 811 (2d Cir. 1971).
" E.g., Ayala v. United States, 550 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. dismissed, 435 U.S.
982 (1978); Moor v. Madigan, 458 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1972), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, sub
nom. Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
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ment, in the context of the jurisdictional amount, that "[j]oinder
'12
of claims, not joinder of parties, is the object of the doctrine.
The Supreme Court, reviewing two of these Ninth Circuit decisions, has managed to leave the question open.13 In both cases the
plaintiff had joined with his federal claim against a state officer
under section 198314 a vicarious state law claim against the officer's
local government employer. In the first, the Court found that, regardless of the question of power, the district judge had acted within
his discretion in refusing to entertain the state claim because of "the
unsettled nature of state law and the likelihood of jury confusion.""
In the second, the Court held that Congress's decision not to provide
a remedy against local governments in section 1983 itself" implicitly
17
precluded pendent jurisdiction.
If this were the whole story, there would be little worth discussing; the policy of judicial economy either does or does not justify
construing the statutory "civil action" and the constitutional
"Case" to include pendent parties as well as pendent claims.18 After
Gibbs I should have thought it did.
II.

ZAHN V. INTERNATIONAL PAPER CO.

Zahn v. InternationalPaperCo. 11 was a class action brought by
four plaintiffs for pollution damage to themselves and to others
similarly situated. Federal jurisdiction was based upon diversity of
citizenship; each of the named plaintiffs asserted claims individually exceeding the statutory minimum of $10,000.20 The Supreme
12Hymer v. Chai, 407 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1969).
'3 Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1977), aff'g 513 F.2d 1257 (9th Cir. 1975); Moor v.
County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973), affg in part, revg in part, Moor v. Madigan, 458
F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1972).
, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
15 Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 716 (1973).
"The overruling of this premise in Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658
(1978), which held a local government body a "person" within section 1983, does not affect
the present analysis.
11Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 17 (1976). I have criticized this decision in The
Supreme Court and FederalJurisdiction:1975 Term, 1976 Sup. CT. Rxv. 183, 197.
1 A holding that a "civil action" under § 1331 does not include related claims against
additional parties ought to mean that the federally cognizable part of the case is itself a "civil
action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction," 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1970), so
as to permit removal of that part alone from a state court without regard to the narrow
construction of § 1441(c)'s provision for removal of a "separate and independent claim" in
American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 13-14 (1951).
" 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
S"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter
in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000 . . . and is between . ..citizens of
different States. . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1970).
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Court affirmed a refusal to hear any claims of class members that
did not independently satisfy the $10,000 requirement: since the
claims were not joint, the Court held precedent "requires that any
plaintiff without the jurisdictional amount must be dismissed from
the case, even though others allege jurisdictionally sufficient
claims."",
The precedent chiefly relied on was Snyder v. Harris,22 which
had refused to aggregate the amounts claimed by class members
lacking joint interests in order to determine whether there was any
federal jurisdiction at all. In policy terms, Snyder was no precedent
whatever, for in Snyder no single claim satisfied the amount requirement. It is one thing to hold one cannot independently force a
flock of petty controversies upon a federal court by combining them
in a single complaint; it is quite another to remit the holders of petty
claims to a duplicative state court suit when there is a substantial
federal suit pending.
In statutory terms, Zahn's reliance upon Snyder is more troublesome. Snyder held that the claim of each party representing a
separate interest is a separate "matter in controversy," which under
section 1332 must exceed $10,000.2 It might be thought to follow
that the "civil action" over which section 1332 gives jurisdiction
similarly includes only the claim of the individual plaintiff whose
claim exceeds $10,000.24 But the statutory use of the singular-"the

matter in controversy"-seems too weak a reed to preclude the possibility that one "civil action" (or one article III "Case" or "Controversy") may contain more than one "matter in controversy." For
example, I would not find the "matter in controversy" in a simple
two-party action sufficiently great when related federal and state
claims of $6000 each are joined. Under Gibbs there is a single "civil
action," but it is the matter arising under federal law that must
exceed $10,000. Similarly, while it was plausible to hold in Snyder
that the claim of each separate class member constituted a distinct
"matter in controversy" in order to avoid unnecessary decision of
petty claims, it would have made sense in Zahn to hold that these
several "matter[s] in controversy" constituted a single "civil action" in order to avoid multiple litigation.2
,1 414 U.S. at 300.
:' 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
• 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970).
7A See note 20 supra.
nClark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583 (1939), the much older precedent truly analogous
to Zahn that was invoked both in that opinion and in Synder, surely should have been
considered fair game for reconsideration in light of the modem philosophy expressed so
forcefully in Gibbs.
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Zahn itself, however, decided before the Supreme Court last
went through such contortions to avoid the pendent party issue,
implicitly resolves it. The Court in Zahn did not consciously give a
narrow construction to the term "civil action"; it thought it was
dealing with a "construction of the 'matter in controversy' requirement of § 1332."6 But it did not hold (and could not very well have
held) that the matter in controversy was less than $10,000, for it
acknowledged there was jurisdiction over the claims of the named
plaintiffs. 27 Jurisdiction, once established as it was in Zahn, extends
under Gibbs to the entire "civil action"; in holding there was no
power to entertain the claims of absent class members, the Court
must have held they were not part of the same-"civil action." It
follows that a nonfederal claim against an additional defendant is
not a part of the "civil action" over which a federal claim gives
jurisdiction unless the defendants share (in Snyder's words) a
"common and undivided interest."2
The factual differences between Zahn and the hypothesized
case are not significant. Snyder, on which Zahn was based, emphatically rejected any distinction between class actions and voluntary
joinder of parties under rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: "[IUt was in joinder cases . . . that the doctrine that distinct
claims could not be aggregated was originally enunciated."' 2' I also
see no reason to doubt Zahn would apply to multiple defendants as
well as to multiple plaintiffs, 0 or to cases in which the original claim
is based on a federal question rather than diversity, for in such cases
the statutory language is identical. 3 That the jurisdictional defect
for the pendent party in the latter case is lack of a federal question
rather than insufficient amount should not matter: if claims respecting nonjoint parties are not part of the "civil action," they
may not be entertained unless they independently satisfy all jurisdictional requirements. Moreover, in policy terms the cases cannot
"414

U.S. at 301.

Id. at 292.
Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 335 (1969).

at 337.
- Cited as an example of the "unbroken line" of precedents in Zahn, 414 U.S. at 294
n.3, was Walter v. Northeastern R.R., 147 U.S. 370 (1893), stating the rule limiting aggregation by plaintiffs and adding "when two or more defendants are sued by the same plaintiff
in one suit the test of jurisdiction is the joint or several character of the liability to the
plaintiff." Id. at 373.
"1 See notes 6 & 18 supra; Zahn, 414 U.S. at 302 n.11 (dictum) ("Because a class action
invoking general federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 would be subject to the
same jurisdictional-amount rules with respect to plaintiffs having separate and distinct
claims, the result here would be the same even if a cause of action under federal law could
be stated").
2Id.
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be distinguished: the desirability of avoiding multiple proceedings
2
is unaffected by the nature of the jurisdictional defect.
III.

COMPLE DwvsRsrrY

The Matter in Controversy

A.

"[Dliversity jurisdiction," the Court said only last term, "does
not exist unless each defendant is a citizen of a different State from
each plaintiff."s Derived from the early and conclusory opinion in
Strawbridge v. Curtiss,s4 this rule today is based upon construction
of section 1332's requirement that "the matter in controversy" be
"between citizens of different States." The definition of the same
term "matter in controversy" was in issue in Snyder and also, according to the Court, in Zahn.s
Snyder holds that the claims of multiple parties without joint
interests do not constitute a single "matter in controversy."
Strawbridge itself was consistent with this interpretation, for it applied the complete diversity rule only to a case in which there were
joint interests. Indeed, in the early case of Cameron v. M' Roberts,6
the Supreme Court applied Strawbridgein a manner wholly parallel
to the interpretation of "matter in controversy" in Snyder: "If a
distinct interest vested in [the diverse defendant] . . . so that
substantial justice . . . could be done without affecting the other
defendants, the jurisdiction of the court might be exercised as to
him alone. 37 Both before and after that decision, however, the
Court viewed the Strawbridge principle in an entirely different
light. In Corporationof New Orleans v. Winter,"s where the plain32

If there were a distinction it would cut the other way: the amount requirement is

merely statutory, the absence of a federal question or diversity is of constitutional significance. Thus the policy of judicial economy would be a more compelling argument for extending jurisdiction in Zahn than in the unresolved pendent party case.

When federal jurisdiction of the federal claim is exclusive, as under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1338
(patents and copyrights) and 1346(b) (tort claims against United States) (1970), "the additional argument that only in a federal court may all of the claims be tried together", Aldinger
v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 18 (1976) (dictum) (footnote omitted), might support a broader
construction of the same term "civil action." The Ninth Circuit, however, has given the
narrow construction I attribute to Zahn to the constitutional term "Case" and refused
pendent-party jurisdiction even in a § 1346 case. Ayala v. United States, 550 F.2d 1196, 11991200 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. dismissed, 98 S. Ct. 1635 (1978).

33Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 98 S. Ct. 2396, 2403 (1978).
u 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
31Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 292-93 (1973); Snyder v. Harris, 394
U.S. 332, 336 (1969).
3'

16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 591 (1818).

v Id. at 593-94.

3 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 91 (1816).
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tiffs were heirs seeking to recover a parcel of land, the Court thought
it unnecessary to decide whether their interests were joint or several:
"[H]aving elected to sue jointly, the court is incapable of distinguishing their case. . . from one in which they were compelled to
unite."" In PeninsularIron Co. v. Stone04 the Court expressly extended Strawbridgeto a case in which the interests were admittedly
not joint:
In the present case the rights of each and all of the parties
depend on the alleged contract with Stone, and although, as
between themselves, they have separate and distinct interests,
...
. [t]here is but a single cause of action, and while all the
complainants need not have joined in enforcing it, they have
done so, and this, under the rule in New Orleans v. Winter,
controls the jurisdiction."
For present purposes, the significance of the decisions extending Strawbridge to cases of nonjoint interests lies not in the fact
that the Court refused to entertain the nondiverse claims. To dismiss those and to hear the claims between the diverse parties, as
suggested in Cameron, would have paved the way for Snyder's
holding that each of the nonijoint claims represents a separate "matter in controversy." _The significant fact is that in both Winter and
PeninsularIron the Court ordered or approved dismissal of the diverse claims as well."2 The presence of a nondiverse party destroyed
jurisdiction over the entire "suit"; it was not a suit "between citizens of different States." To follow these decisions today, as the
Supreme Court quotation beginning this section suggests we should,
would be, contrary to Snyder, to view the claims of multiple, nonjoint parties as a single "matter in controversy."'" For if, as Snyder
held, such a case contains two "matter[s] in controversy," the
Court should not dismiss them both; it should retain jurisdiction
over the diverse one."
Id. at 95.
121 U.S. 631 (1887).
4' Id. at 633; accord, Hooe v. Jamieson, 166 U.S. 395, 397-98 (1897).
a Peninsular Iron Co. v. Stone, 121 U.S. 631, 633 (1887); Corporation of New Orleans v.
Winter, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 91, 94.95 (1816).
"A statement in a later case suggests the matter remained in doubt. In Florida Cent. &
Peninsular R.R. v. Bell, 176 U.S. 321 (1900), an action by eight plaintiffs, five of whom had
not alleged diversity of citizenship, "the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court would have failed,
at least as to five of the plaintiffs, if that jurisdiction depended solely on the citizenship of
the parties." Id. at 325 (emphasis added).
" An example may help. If a Pennsylvania plaintiff sues Pennsylvania and Delaware
defendants for $6000 each, it is inconsistent to hold that the "matter in controversy" is only
3'
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A number of lower court decisions have indeed reached the
latter result by allowing the nondiverse party to be dismissed. 5 But
it is not the result on which my argument depends; it is the theory.
Some of the decisions allowing dismissal of the nondiverse party
alone explicitly embrace the theory that there is no jurisdiction over
any part of the case until dismissal of the improper party: " '[I]f
jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship is defeated by the existence of parties who are not indispensable in an action, jurisdiction, although not existing at the time of filing, can be acquired by
dismissing the action as to such parties . .. '"46 This is not the

sole approach." It is, however, the approach most consistent with
Supreme Court precedents, and it is therefore correct until the
Court changes its position.
Separately analyzed, Strawbridge and Snyder can both be
made to appear reasonably persuasive in terms of policy. The argument that the presence of adverse cocitizens may obviate the fear
of prejudice, while of very questionable force when interests are not
joint,4" suggests a broad construction of "matter in controversy" in
Strawbridge; the policy of avoiding collections of petty controversies
suggests a narrow construction in Snyder. But we are not construing
the same words in two separate statutes. Section 1332 uses the term
once, modified by two separate clauses: there is jurisdiction "where
the matter in controversy exceeds.

.

.$10,000, .

and is between

. . .citizens of different States."
History may help. The 1789 statute did not utilize the same
term to define both amount and diversity. There was jurisdiction
"where the matter in dispute" exceeded $500 and "the suit" was
diverse. 9 I know of no reason to think the revisers in streamlining
$6000 (Snyder) and is incompletely diverse (Strawbridge). If there is one nondiverse
"matter," as Strawbridgetells us, its amount is $12,000; if there are two "matters," as held
in Snyder, one of them is diverse.
" See, e.g., Ray v. Bird & Son & Asset Realization Co., 519 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir. 1975)
(per curiam); Kerr v. Compagnie de Ultramar, 250 F.2d 860 (2d Cir. 1958); Haase v. Mallenkrodt, Inc., 415 F. Supp. 889, 890 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). But cf. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co.
v. Wagner, 367 F.2d 866, 870 n.5 (8th Cir. 1966) (refusing on appeal to preserve jurisdiction
by allowing dismissal of parties who were not indispensable).
"1Reed v. Robilio, 376 F.2d 392, 394 (6th Cir. 1967) (emphasis added) (quoting Grant
County Deposit Bank v. McCampbell, 194 F.2d 469, 472 (6th Cir. 1952)). See also C. WmoRHT,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF THE FEDERAL CoumRS § 69, at 328 (3d ed. 1976): "If the defect is
curable, as where diversity is destroyed by the presence of a party who is not indispensable,
it is possible to cure the defect by dropping the nondiverse party."
11See, e.g., Anderson v. Moorer, 372 F.2d 747, 750 (5th Cir. 1967), which speaks as
though there is jurisdiction from the outset over the diverse claim.
" See Currie, The FederalCourts and the American Law Institute (pt. I), 36 U. Cm. L.
REV. 1, 18-19 (1968).
" Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73.
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the language meant to make any change in established doctrine.
Perhaps history and statutory purpose together are sufficient to
overcome the insistent conclusion from the statute itself that the
"matter" that must exceed $10,000 and the "matter" that must be
diverse are one and the same.
B.

Civil Action

The rule of complete diversity and the doctrine limiting aggregation of multiparty claims are both of such long standing that news
of their possible statutory incompatibility is certain to fall on deaf
ears. In such circumstances stare decisis is at its most persuasive. I
mention the ramifications of Strawbridge only because they are
relevant to the professtdly still unresolved question of pendent
party jurisdiction.
I have argued that Zahn, by implicitly holding a "civil action"
does not include pendent parties, effectively resolves that question.
The extended Strawbridgerule, however, implicitly resolves it the
other way. The complete diversity rule, as I have suggested, presupposes that the "matter in controversy" in a "civil action" embraces
claims involving multiple parties with nonjoint interests; if the
"matter in controversy" is that broad, so is the "civil action" that
contains itY' History cannot bail us out of this one. The inconsistency is even more obvious under the 1789 statute, which used the
same word to express both ideas: there was jurisdiction over the
"suit" when the "suit" was diverse.5 1 The clear implication of the
complete diversity rule is that a single "civil action" includes claims
involving multiple, nonjoint parties.2 Thus, not only does Zahn fail
to follow from Snyder as a matter of either statutory language or
policy-Zahn is inconsistent with Strawbridge.
Stare decisis, no doubt, will nevertheless preserve both doctrines; and if this were the whole picture, one could safely argue
that the pendent party case in which the jurisdictional defect is
lack of a federal question is more closely analogous, in significant
' Section 1331 makes this clear by referring to "civil actions wherein the matter in
controversy exceeds. . . $10,000. . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970) (emphasis added). The
substitution of "where" for "wherein" in § 1332 can scarcely be more than an accident. See
notes 6 & 20 supra.
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73.
'z This implication, moreover, is made explicit by § 1332(a)(3), which gives jurisdiction
over "civil actions where the matter in controversy. . . is between. . . citizens of different
states and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are additional parties.. . ." Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, § 3, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976) (to be codified
in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(3)).
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respects, to Zahn than to Strawbridge.But I have not yet mentioned
53
the wonderful case of Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble.
IV. BEN-HUR
In a class action, the Court held in Ben-Hur, diversity will be
determined by reference to the citizenship of the original named
parties alone; that other members of the plaintiff class may be
cocitizens of a defendant is immaterial." To begin with, it is not
easy to reconcile this decision with Strawbridge unless one concludes that absent members, like trust beneficiaries,55 are not to be
considered parties. Since they are invisible, the existence of absent
members will not influence a biased state tribunal one way or the
other, even though they will be affected by the outcome." This
theory, however, appears to be inconsistent with the treatment of
absent class members in Zahn and in Snyder; if the named plaintiffs in those cases were effectively trustees for absent class members
they should have been allowed, as individual plaintiffs traditionally
have been, to aggregate or to append their several claims. 7
Indeed, the Ben-Hur opinion appears to rely not on the trustee
analogy but on the doctrine that the court had jurisdiction,
"ancillary" to that over the diverse named plaintiffs, to determine
the rights of nondiverse class members. Quoting extensively from
Stewart v. Dunham,5" which had allowed "ancillary" intervention
by a nondiverse party, the Court said the principle of Stewart
"controls this case."'" "The intervention of the Indiana citizens in
this suit would not have defeated the jurisdiction already acquired,"
and therefore, without having intervened, they were bound by the
- 255 U.S. 356 (1921).
Id. at 366.
uBonnafee v. Williams, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 574, 577 (1845) ("A person having the legal
right may sue ... in the federal courts without reference to the citizenship of those who may
have the equitable interest.").
" See C. WRIGHT, supra note 46, § 31. at 117 n.38 (explaining Ben-Hur on this basis);
Comment, Limited Partnershipsand Federal Diversity Jurisdiction,45 U. Cm. L. Rxv. 384,
406, 409 (1978).
"See Snyder, 394 U.S. at 335 ("Aggregation has been permitted... in cases in which
a single plaintiff seeks to aggregate two or more of his own claims against a single defendant."). Indeed it may not be necessary in such a case even to speak of aggregation; a trustee
has but one claim though he may have to distribute the proceeds among several beneficiaries.
Cf. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 346 (1977) (refusing
to discuss aggregation: "Obviously, if the Commission has standing to litigate the claims of
its constituents, it may also rely on them to meet the requisite amount in controversy.").
- 115 U.S. 61 (1885).
I 255 U.S. at 365.

HeinOnline -- 45 U. Chi. L. Rev. 762 1977-1978

1978]

Pendent Parties

decree. 0 "If the decree is to be effective and conflicting judgments
are to be avoided all of the class must be concluded by the decree.""1
If ancillary jurisdiction explains Ben-Hur, that case remains
difficult to square with Strawbridge, but only on the question (not
relevant to the scope of a "suit" or "civil action") whether "between
citizens of different States" requires complete rather than minimal
diversity. 2 With respect to the breadth of a "civil action"
Strawbridge and Ben-Hur seem to agree: the "action" includes
claims of multiple parties. For this reason it was unfortunate for the
Court in Zahn, in the face of a dissent invoking Ben-Hur, not to
address the significance of that decision.
One fact I have omitted to state could serve to reconcile BenHur with Zahn. The complaint in Ben-Hur, which the Supreme
Court did not disparage, had asserted that the plaintiffs all had "a
common but indivisible interest" in the trust funds at issue. 3 Zahn
therefore could be taken to limit the ancillary jurisdiction asserted
under Ben-Hur to members whose interests are joint."
On the other hand, nothing in the reasoning of Ben-Hur seems
to limit that decision to joint interests. Moreover, the suggested
distinction makes no sense in terms of the policy evidently underlying Strawbridge.It is when interests are several that an out-of-state
party is most likely to need the jurisdiction provided by Ben-Hur
to protect him from bias in the local court; when interests are joint,
a biased tribunal may be unable to injure the outsider without
harming a local coparty as well. It is therefore entirely possible the
Court would apply Ben-Hur to nonjoint class actions notwithstanding Zahn. Such an application would cast further doubt on the
outcome of my unresolved pendent party case, for, as so applied,
Ben-Hur, like Strawbridge, appears to run counter to the narrow
reading of "civil action" that emerges from Zahn. Indeed, since
Ben-Hur appears to involve pendent parties, it represents an even
stronger challenge than does Strawbridge to Zahn's implied disposition of the pendent party issue. In one respect Ben-Hur is even
closer than Zahn to the unresolved pendent party case, for Ben-Hur
shares with the unresolved case the principal factor arguably distinguishing that case from Zahn: the jurisdictional defect was not insufficient amount, but lack of either a federal question or diversity.
" Id. at 366.
"
82

Id. at 367.
Id. at 361.

63

Id.

" As it has been held to mean in the interpleader statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1970). See
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967).
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I would expect the Court, if confronted in a pendent party case
with the competing analogies of Zahn and Ben-Hur, to choose the
more recent Zahn as the more compelling. Even if Ben-Hur is not
distinguished on the ground that it involved joint interests, its upholding of ancillary jurisdiction was clearly limited,"5 as Zahn's was
not,6 to class actions: in other cases, diversity must be complete.
Nevertheless, the Court's preoccupation with the "matter in controversy" language in Zahn makes prediction uncertain.
V.

LATER PARTIES

Another line of decisions is relevant to our problem. In avoiding
the broad pendent party issue in Moor v. County of Alameda," the
Supreme Court referred to the "substantial analogues in the joinder
of new parties under the well-established doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction in the context of compulsory counterclaims under Fed. Rules
Civ. Proc. 13(a) and 13(h), and in the context of third-party claims
under Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 14(a)." 8
The source of ancillary jurisdiction over later parties is
Freeman v. Howe, 9 which declared that a federal court in which
property had been attached could entertain other claims to the
same property without an independent jurisdictional basis. Since
federal control of the property was exclusive, the claimants would
otherwise have been without remedy." Later decisions extended the
principle to allow intervention as of right by nondiverse parties who
were not indispensable, although the only apparent consequence
was to avoid multiple litigation." Lower courts, as Moor indicates,
have utilized the same reasoning in sustaining jurisdiction over
claims brought under rules 13 and 14 that were not independently
7

cognizable.

1

The statutory basis of all these decisions can only be a broad
construction of the term "civil action." This construction, moreover, derives support from the Supreme Court's holding, in
Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets,73 that a state-court plaintiff
- 255 U.S. at 366-67.
91414 U.S. at 299-301.
- 411 U.S. 693 (1973).
" Id. at 714-15 (footnotes omitted).
" 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1860).
7*Id. at 460.
"1 E.g., Wichita R.R. & Light Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 260 U.S. 48 (1922); Stewart
v. Dunham, 115 U.S. 61 (1885).
12 E.g., Huggins v. Graves, 337 F.2d 486 (6th Cir. 1964).
n 313 U.S. 100 (1941).
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against whom a counterclaim is filed cannot remove to federal court
because he is not, as the statute requires, a "defendant"; 7 4 the necessary implication is that the counterclaim is not a separate "civil
action" within the meaning of section 1441, which refers back to the
same term in sections 1331 and 1332.
One possible means of reconciling these cases with Zahn would
be to hold that a "civil action" includes additional parties only if
they are added after the original complaint. This interpretation is
supported by the Court's reliance in an intervention case on the
maxim that jurisdiction once acquired is not defeated by later
events. 75 Although the maxim applies only when-as in the addition
of a nondiverse party to a diversity case7 -the new claim jeopardizes jurisdiction over the original action, the broad construction of
"civil action" necessary to take care of the redetermination problem
would extend as well to post-complaint ancillary claims with federal
question and amount defects, without requiring a broad interpretation with respect to the original complaint. Redetermination, however, can be avoided simply by refusing ancillary jurisdiction of the
new claim; the decision to accept it seems to reflect the judgment
that judicial efficiency requires construing "civil action" broadly
enough to allow claims respecting additional parties to be tried
along with a claim properly in federal court. Thus the dictum in
Moor apparently endorsing decisions allowing ancillary jurisdiction
over parties added after the complaint is filed is arguably inconsistent with Zahn and suggests that jurisdiction may yet be upheld in
the case of the original pendent party where the jurisdictional defect
is not the amount in controversy. If Zahn is perceived as having
given a narrow construction to "civil action," it, rather than the
Moor dictum, must control. But the probability that it will is substantially reduced by the fact that the Court in Zahn did not perceive that that was what it was doing.
Most recently, in Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger,7"
the Court has confirmed the view of most of the lower courts78 that
ancillary jurisdiction does not permit a plaintiff to assert a claim
7, [Any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the
United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States-for the district and division embracing
the place where such action is pending.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1970).
' Stewart v. Dunham, 115 U.S. 61, 64 (1885).
7' It is also in this situation, however, that the danger of using third-party practice to
undermine jurisdictional limitations (Strawbridge)is most evident.
98 S. Ct. 2396 (1978).
7' E.g., Kenrose Mfg. Co. v. Whitaker Co., 512 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1972).
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over a cocitizen impleaded under rule 14 by a defendant in a diversity case. In so holding, the Court relied heavily on the argument
that a contrary decision would have undermined the complete diversity requirement of Strawbridge v. Curtiss;it did not attempt to
cast doubt upon the traditional exercise of ancillary jurisdiction
over claims of defendants or intervenors. One of the Court's bases
for distinguishing those cases, however, suggests that it will be less
hospitable toward attempts by plaintiffs than by defendants or intervenors to bring in additional parties:
[T]he nonfederal claim here was asserted by the plaintiff, who
voluntarily chose to bring suit upon a state-law claim in a
federal court. By contrast, ancillary jurisdiction typically involves claims by a defending party haled into court against his
will, or by another person whose rights might be irretrievably
lost unless he could assert them in an ongoing action in a federal court. . . . "[Tihe efficiency plaintiff seeks so avidly is
available without question in the state courts."79
Given the Court's emphasis on Strawbridge, it is not clear whether
the Court would have drawn the same distinction if the sole defect
of the plaintiffs claim had been the jurisdictional amount. The
Court did not say whether it was construing "matter in controversy"
or "civil action." Nevertheless, the quoted passage suggests that the
Court would not find the ancillary jurisdiction cases sufficient to
outweigh Zahn in passing on pendent parties in the initial complaint.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court has approached the problems of pendent
nonfederal parties, incomplete diversity, and the amount in controversy as though they were essentially unrelated. It has not paid
much attention to the interpretation of the statutory language,
which should be determinative. If it had, I think it would have
discovered that the issues are closely interdependent, as all are affected by the breadth of the term "civil action."
Zahn is the bad apple. Gibbs and its policy of efficiency demanded pendent jurisdiction in Zahn, as many lower courts have
understood in cases involving additional parties in both the original
complaint and subsequent pleadings. The cases on complete diversity similarly support a broad reading of "civil action." That the
71 98 S. Ct. at 2404 (1978) (footnote omitted).
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Court in Zahn seems to have thought it was dealing with the separate problem of determining the amount of the "matter in controversy" may nevertheless serve to limit what would normally be the
effect of the decision; the Court may yet uphold jurisdiction over
pendent parties in other contexts at the cost of consistency both in
the interpretation of statutory language and in relevant policy.
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